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THE "GO FISH" PRINCIPLE OF TRADEMARK
REGISTRATION AND THE CONSEQUENCES
OF PLAYING AGAINST A LOADED DECK
I. INTRODUCTION
Substantial similarities among products in highly competitive
markets will often force competing companies to rely on the
strength of a particular trademark to sell a particular product.
Trademark reliance is perhaps most apparent in the personal com-
puter market, where numerous well known companies have intro-
duced a line of "cloned" personal computers in reliance on the
strength of each company's tradename to distinguish and sell the
computers. Other companies have even attempted to lessen the dis-
tinction between the sound and appearance of the tradename, as
well as the product.' Many high technology related companies
have a penchant toward using tradenames which are similar in
sound or appearance. Although some of the similarities are due to
a lack of imagination,2 others result from pure coincidence, such as
the following similar tradenames: Tandy,3 Tandem,4 and Tandon5
Similarities between tradenames can also be the result of intentional
infringement.6
Sometimes companies know that another similar mark exists
before its own trademark or servicemark is selected.7 At other
1. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 221 U.S.P.Q.
762 (9th Cir. 1984) (trademark "Pineapple" for personal computer found to infringe regis-
tered mark "Apple" for personal computer, and copyrighted computer programs also
infringed).
2. The March 1987 Pacific Bell White Pages for San Jose-Santa Clara, California, list
77 companies with tradenames beginning with the word "micro."
3. Originally the name of a family owned leather store in 1899, Tandy became more
widely known when Charles Tandy purchased a nearly bankrupt mail order electronics busi-
ness in 1963 called Radio Shack. M. MOSKovrrz, M. KATz & R. LEVERING; EVERYBODY'S
BUSINESS: AN ALMANAC, AT 331 (1980).
4. A computer and electronics manufacturing company whose first major product was
reputedly a failsafe computer system comprised of two computer systems operating in
tandem.
5. A computer and computer peripherals manufacturer reputedly started in the garage
of Sirang Lal Tandon.
6. J. Rydstrum; RIGHT OF OWNER OF TRADEMARK FOR APPAREL OR
TOILETRIES TO PROTECTION UNDER LANHAM ACT (15 USC. SEC. 1114(1))
AGAINST INFRINGEMENT BY AUTHOR'S USE OF SIMILAR MARK FOR DIF-
FERENT ITEMS OF APPAREL OR TOILETRIES; 38 A.L.R. FED. 374, 414 (1983).
7. Tradenames, trademarks, and servicemarks will be referred to as "marks" from
hereon. Caesar's World, Inc. v. Caesar's Palace, 490 F. Supp 818, 209 U.S.P.Q. 492 (D.N.J.
1980). There is virtually no difference between trademarks and servicemarks, except for the
fact that trademarks identify goods and servicemarks identify services.
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times, the similar mark may be discovered while performing a
trademark search.' Occasionally, a similar mark will not be discov-
ered until an application for registration has been filed, or an in-
fringement action has been filed, because a search for previously
registered marks was not performed prior to registration or usage.
Some similar marks can be used for years without ever attracting
the attention of the owner of the other mark. Yet, an attempted
registration of the mark will often alert the owner of a similar mark
to such use, or to an expansion of such use.9
When an applicant attempts to register a mark, the application
can be refused for a number of reasons relating to any similarity
between applicant's mark and any previously registered mark. An
applicant who has had an application for registration refused, yet
continues to use the mark, will often be sued for infringement by the
owner of the mark upon which applicant's registration was refused.
An explanation of the well-known card game "fish" can be useful in
understanding the effect of continued use of a rejected mark.
In the card game, each player is dealt a number of different
cards which are unknown to the other players. The object of the
game is to collect all of the cards of a particular kind, such as all
four "2s," by asking other players for a particular card or drawing
from the remainder of cards left in the deck. When a set of cards is
collected, it is laid face-up on the table. The first player to collect
enough sets of cards to clear his hand of all cards wins the game.
To collect cards, in order to form a set, each player must ask for a
particular card, at least one of which is in his hand, from one of the
other players. If the person asked for a card does not have one of
those cards, the asking player must draw a card from the remainder
of the deck. Drawing a card is referred to as having to "go fish."
Asking the wrong person for a card will alert other players to
what cards are in the hand of the asking player. Thus, there is a
possibility that one of the other players will ask the original asking
player for the same card, and the original asking player will lose the
card.
Accordingly, the game of "fish" can be analogized to asking
8. A "trademark search" is the process of checking the primary and supplemental
registers of the United States Patent and Trademark Office or any state registers for similar
marks to the work in question. Although a number of companies can be hired to perform a
trademark search, many attorneys perform trademark searches on computers that have ac-
cess to data files containing all of the relevant information.
9. Many companies, or diligent defenders of important marks, employ search services
that will alert the prior registrant when applications for similar marks have been filed.
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the wrong player (the Patent and Trademark Office) 10 for a particu-
lar card (filing a trademark application for a similar previously reg-
istered mark).11 If the Patent and Trademark Office tells the asking
player to "go fish" (rejects the application), and another player (the
owner of the mark upon which the rejection was based) has a card
in the same set of cards, that player can ask for the card from the
original asking player (sue the applicant for infringement) and be
able to take away the card (prove infringement). In essence, by be-
ing the first to register his mark, the owner of the registered mark
has loaded the deck and thereby has the ability to learn of the con-
tents of the other player's hands. Hence, continuing to use a mark
after registration of the mark has been refused, based on confusing
similarity to another mark, is 'tantamount to asking the wrong
player for a particular card and continuing to play "fish."
In the card game "fish," a "2" is always a "2." However, un-
like the card game "fish," marks that are found to be confusingly
similar by the Patent and Trademark Office (the Patent Office) are
not always considered to be confusingly similar by consumers.
However, if a court hearing an infringement action concerning the
same two marks considers the prior Patent Office determination re-
garding the similarity between the marks to be conclusive, the party
who had attempted registration of the allegedly infringing mark
may never be able to prove that consumers were not confused.
This comment addresses two issues: (1) whether a client should
attempt to obtain the additional benefits and greater certainty that
often accompany registration of a mark, even if there is knowledge
that the mark may be rejected by the Patent Office because of con-
fusing similarities with a previously registered mark; and (2)
whether evidence of an unsuccessful registration attempt can be
used in a subsequent infringement action by the owner of the regis-
tered mark, and if so, what weight such evidence will be accorded.
This comment will commence by briefly stating relevant por-
tions of the trademark registration process. The basic tests that are
used to determine whether a mark can be registered and whether
trademark infringement exists will be compared. The comment will
then analyze how various federal courts have treated Patent Office
determinations in subsequent infringement actions where similari-
10. The Patent and Trademark Office is referred to as the wrong party because the
applicant could have attempted to ask the owner of the mark for a license or taken some
other precaution, rather than simply filing for registration.
11. Trademark applications are reviewed by the Patent and Trademark Office of the
federal government, which is commonly referred to as the Patent Office, regardless of
whether in reference to patent or trademark matters.
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ties between the marks were at issue. 2 An enumeration of the
means by which to resolve the confusion among the various circuits
will be presented. Finally, the comment will address how the ap-
plicant, or potential applicant, should view a rejection based on con-
fusing similarity to another mark.
II. TRADEMARK REGISTRATION
After an attorney files an application for trademark registra-
tion with the Patent Office, the Examining Attorney (Examiner) as-
signed to review that application will run a search of previously
registered marks and compare those marks against the applicant's
mark.13 If the applicant's mark is found to be similar to a previ-
ously registered mark, the Examiner can reject the application
under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 1052(d). If a mark sought to be registered so
resembles a presently registered mark as to be likely, when applied
to the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive the public, then the Examiner is to reject the
application. 14 After an initial rejection, the applicant may desire
the attorney to respond and attempt to overcome the Examiner's
rejection."' This process continues until the Examiner no longer
objects to the mark, 6 issues a final rejection, 7 or the applicant
abandons the application.' 8
An application can be abandoned by filing a written request for
abandonment.' 9 An application can also be abandoned by failing to
respond or completely respond to an office action within a six-
month period.20 Requesting abandonment can have an advantage
over failing to respond, if the purpose of the latter is to abandon the
application.2
12. Federal court decisions are focused on herein, although states may regulate trade-
mark activity in the absence of any clear conflict with federal trademark law, and a trade-
mark may still acquire common law rights even if federal registration has not been acquired.
J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 7.04 (1986).
13. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) §§ 1104 and 1105.01
(1983).
14. TMEP § 1205 (1983).
15. 37 C.F.R. § 2.62 (1986).
16. 37 C.F.R. § 2.63 (1986).
17. 37 C.F.R. § 2.64 (1986).
18. 37 C.F.R. § 2.65 (1986).
19. 37 C.F.R. § 2.68 (1986).
20. 37 C.F.R. § 2.62 (1986).
21. Abandoned application files not marked for retention are destroyed two years after
abandonment. See TMEP § 1112.06. If an unsuccessful client is in a hurry to have a file
destroyed, a written request for abandonment will trigger the two-year retention period.
Otherwise, the file will be retained for two years after the six-month statutory response per-
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If a final rejection is issued, the applicant may request that the
examiner reconsider the final action, but the Examiner need not re-
spond. Any request for reconsideration will not extend the time for
filing an appeal. 2 If the Examiner appears unlikely to allow the
mark after a final action, and the applicant desires to pursue the
application, the Examiner's decision can be appealed to the Trade-
mark Trial and Appeals Board (Appeals Board). 3
Adverse ex parte (applications) Appeal Board rulings, 4 are
either appealable to the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit),25 or to the federal district court where there is an adverse
party for a trial de novo.2 6 New evidence may be entered as evi-
dence in the new trial along with the record from the ex parte ac-
tion.2 7 Once an ex parte trademark action gets into federal district
court, it proceeds under normal trial procedure."8 However, be-
cause the Commissioner is the adverse party in ex parte actions, all
expenses of the proceeding are paid by the applicant, regardless of
whether the final decision is in the applicant's favor or not.29 Fed-
eral Circuit decisions are only reviewable upon writ of certiorari3"
to the Supreme Court."
iod, which means that six months (approximately) can be cut off the retention period by
requesting abandonment. However, the utility of taking advantage of this shortened reten-
tion period would be questionable because abandoned and destroyed PTO files may still be
accessible through discovery if still retained by the client.
22. 37 C.F.R. § 2.64(b) (1986).
23. 37 C.F.R. § 2.141 (1986).
24. An ex parte ruling is the result of an action brought by the applicant.
25. 37 C.F.R. § 2.145 (1986).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1986). Ex parte appeals are before the federal district court for
the District of Columbia because the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks is the adverse
party.
27. Digiom, Inc. v. Digicon, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 631 (D.C. Tex. 1971) (Trademark Trial
and Appeals Board decision reversed on the basis of new evidence).
28. "Normal trial procedure" means that the action cannot be appealed to the Court of
Appeals, Federal Circuit, but must instead be appealed through the court of appeals for the
circuit embracing the district. 28 U.S.C. § 1294. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
Federal Circuit, is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to the jurisdictions described in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c) and (d) and § 1295. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 refers to appeals from interlocutory orders or
decrees arising in cases in which the court would have jurisdiction of and appeal under
§ 1295. The Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
final actions of district courts whose jurisdiction was based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338, but claims relating to trademarks (provided that there are no patent or plant variety
protection claims involved) are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit,. 28
U.S.C. § 1295.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (1986).
30. 28 U.S.C. 17 (amend. Jan. 1, 1986).
31. Although Supreme Court review is available, the very reason that confusion exists
between the various circuits hearing cases related to the problem addressed by this comment
is because the Supreme Court has declined to settle the dissension among the federal appellate
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Allowed marks are not safe from potential challenge under 35
U.S.C. Sec. 1052(d). A mark must be published by the Patent Of-
fice for opposition by other parties before it can be officially regis-
tered.3 2 After registration, a mark can still be challenged 3 within
the Patent Office or in federal district courts and cancelled. Opposi-
tion34 and cancellation3 5 proceedings are held before the Appeals
Board. The interpartes decision36 may be appealed to the Federal
Circuit,37 or to the federal district court, where there is an adverse
party, for a trial de novo. 8 Inter partes actions in federal district
courts also proceed under normal trial procedures.3 9 However, the
Commissioner cannot be made a party to the federal proceeding,
hence, each party must bear its own costs.4°
III. THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The test for determining trademark infringement was set forth
in the Lanham Act of 1946.41 The test considers the likelihood of
confusion between marks in terms of the goods or services on which
they are used and is codified at 15 U.S.C. See. 1114(1). Under the
statute, any person who shall, without consent of the registrant, use
in commerce a mark which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive shall be liable in a civil action brought by the
registrant.42 A comparison of the language used in 35 U.S.C. Sec.
1114(1) and 35 U.S.C. 1052(d) reveals that the Sec. 1114(1) test for
infringement and the Sec. 1052(d) test for registrability are substan-
courts. "[I]t has been suggested that experienced practitioners in some federal 'specialties' no
longer attempt to secure Supreme Court review because they know that the odds of success
are so low." A. Hellman; Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of
Discretionary Review; 44 U. PiTr. L. REv. 795 (1985). Accord HRUSKA COMMISSION
REPORT at 7, Hruska Commission Hearings (Second Phase) at 1147 (statement of Professor
Handler, ".... essay in futility to seek certiorari in a trademark case.")
32. 37 C.F.R. § 2.80 (1986).
33. 37 C.F.R. § 2.111 (1986).
34. 37 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1986).
35. 37 C.F.R. § 2.111 (1986).
36. An inter partes decision is the result of either an opposition or cancellation
proceeding.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1986).
38. Id. § 1071(b). If the adverse party is residing in a foreign country or there are
adverse parties residing in a plurality of districts, the federal district court for the District of
Columbia has jurisdiction.
39. Supra note 28.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(2) (1986).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1113 (1986). Dealing with the registration of trademarks used in
commerce).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
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tially similar with regard to likelihood of confusion.43
Despite the similar language in the two statutes, a determina-
tion of likelihood of confusion in either an ex parte or inter partes
Patent Office proceeding may be of little relevance in a subsequent
infringement action.' In the Patent Office proceeding, the
determination is made with regard to the registrability of the appli-
cant's mark exactly as shown in the application. In the infringe-
ment action, the court is primarily concerned with the party's right
to use a mark in commerce, and therefore considers additional
factors.45
Although the literal distinction between the right to use test
(Sec. 1114(1)) and the right to register test (Sec. 1052(d)) should
appear to be important in a subsequent infringement action, the dis-
tinction is not always recognized. As Judge Rich of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), and now the Federal Circuit,
stated:
[M]any lawyers come into our court and talk as though they
were talking aboat infringement problems, about the right to use
a mark. We always tell them, 'we are not concerned with right
to use here, we are only concerned with right to registration; so
why talk about right to use?' 46
While the Federal Circuit does not have the jurisdiction to
hear trademark infringement actions alone, this quotation by Judge
Rich at least emphasizes that if the distinction is not recognized by
most attorneys, it will not be recognized by most courts. However,
the distinction can have great importance: If a court hearing a sub-
sequent infringement action believes that the issue of likelihood of
confusion previously decided by the Patent Office in the registration
proceeding is the same as the issue now before the court, the client
may in effect be collaterally estopped, or prevented, from rearguing
an adverse Patent Office determination.
In view of the importance of determining likelihood of confu-
43. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kroman Ind. Inc., 493 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1974).
44. Tuvache, Inc. v. Emilio Pucci Perfumes Int'l, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (refusing to stay an infringement action pending a final determination by the Trade-
mark Trial and Appeals Board on the right to register).
45. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stage Coach Properties, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. 481, 484 (9th Cir.
1982) (in regard to an opposition proceeding); Lucien Lelong, Inc v. Dana Perfumes, Inc.,
108 U.S.P.Q. 101, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (in regard to a cancellation proceeding).
46. Honorable Giles S. Rich, Role of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in CON-
TEMPORARY TRADEMARK PROBLEMS IN CONTESTED PATENT OFFICE PROCEEDINGS (R.
Oziel ed. 1969). See generally In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 562
(CCPA 1973) (supports Judge Rich's view on the role of the CCPA in regard to right to
register versus right to use).
1988]
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sion in trademark infringement actions, such issue preclusion, due
to an adverse ruling on the issue in a prior Patent Office proceeding,
would virtually assure the charging party of success in a subsequent
infringement action. Thus, an applicant should consider the possi-
bility that its application for registration of a mark will be rejected,
and the possibility that the owner of the mark upon which the rejec-
tion is based might eventually bring an infringement action against
the rejected applicant. If the possibility of these two events occur-
ring is likely, then the cost associated with losing the infringement
action may greatly exceed the benefits that can be obtained by suc-
cessful registration.
Ideally, an applicant would prefer to be able to take a rejected
application all the way to the Supreme Court without having to fear
that a prior determination would adversely affect its liability in sub-
sequent actions. Unfortunately, an analysis of those courts hearing
subsequent infringement actions reveals that there is no firm answer
as to how far the applicant can take an application before a decision
regarding registration affects his position in a subsequent infringe-
ment action. Thus, it becomes apparent that an applicant desiring
to register a mark should be made aware of the legal pitfalls which
may be encountered if an application for registration is filed before
performing a trademark search, or for the purpose of evaluating the
Patent Office's response.
Although there are not a large number of high technology re-
lated companies involved in the cases reported herein, treatment by
the various federal circuits is pertinent to all federal trademarks re-
gardless of the goods or services to which the marks apply.
IV. CONSIDERATION OF PRIOR PATENT OFFICE
DETERMINATIONS
A. Subsequent Effect of Ex Parte Patent Office
Determinations
Although there have been no recent Supreme Court decisions
considering the judicial effect of ex parte trademark determinations
by the Patent Office, the Supreme Court's holding in Brenner v.
Manson in 1966 indicates that such determinations would not be
binding in subsequent infringement actions.47 In finding that the
Court had certiorari jurisdiction to review decisions of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (now the Federal Circuit), the
Supreme Court stated that the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
47. Brenner v. Manson, 86 S.Ct. 1033, 148 U.S.P.Q. 689 (1966).
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peals is "a court established under Article III ... ," the decisions of
which, are "final and binding in the usual sense."
48
Despite the broad character of the Supreme Court's language,
the Supreme Court was careful to point out that a Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals' determination of patentability in an ex
parte appeal did not "preclude a contrary result in a subsequent
infringement action, any more than issuance of a patent by the Pat-
ent Office or the decision in an earlier infringement action against a
different infringer has that effect." 49 Because the patent appellate
review process is substantially similar to the trademark review pro-
cess,50 the Supreme Court appeared to indicate that neither a Fed-
eral Circuit (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) nor a Patent
Office determination on registrability should be binding in a subse-
quent infringement action. However, the Supreme Court did not
indicate what less than binding effect a Patent Office determination
should be given in a subsequent infringement action.
Logically, as the judicial authority of the reviewing court or
agency increases, so should the persuasiveness of the prior determi-
nation. However, in trademark cases, courts appear more likely to
be influenced by an administrative Patent Office determination,
than a determination of a district court, even though the court can
control the agency. The apparent reason for this anomaly is that
many courts are willing to defer the difficult decision regarding like-
lihood of confusion to the expertise of the administrative agency,
such as the Patent Office," l or even the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 2 In addition, unlike a normal review process,
in which the reviewing authority within one level is exhausted
before moving on to the next level, courts that determine the weight
of an ex parte Patent Office determination in a subsequent infringe-
ment action may be faced with analyzing the weight of a decision
reached at mid-level. For example, the attempted registration in
question may have been abandoned after an initial rejection, second
rejection, final rejection, after an opposition is filed, or at some other
48. Id. at 526.
49. Id. at 519.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1986). Ex parte patent determinations appealed to a district
court for a trial de novo are thereafter reviewed by the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit,
instead of the court of appeals embracing the district; see supra note 28. However, in cases
involving trademarks and not patent or plant patent issues once an action is appealed to a
district court, the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, is lost.
51. Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1970);
Carling Brewing Co., Inc. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 160 U.S.P.Q. 303, 297 F.Supp. 1330 (N.D.
Ga. 1968).
52. Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1970).
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COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURN4L
stage within the Patent Office. Thus, rather than evaluating the fi-
nal determination of the Patent Office, the court may be analyzing a
decision abandoned shortly after the applicant began the applica-
tion process.
It appears logical that courts would at least consider the level
at which an application was terminated before making their own
determination. Unfortunately, the reported proceedings of the dis-
trict courts, or as reported in the appellate reports, are often cursory
and do not note at which point most registration attempts within
the Patent Office were extinguished. Although a few cases specify
whether an application has been rejected once or twice, a majority
of the courts treat a rejection at any level within the Patent Office in
the same manner. Therefore, the courts do not find it necessary to
specify the level at which the Patent Office decision was rendered.
In analyzing the following cases, the lack of a Supreme Court
decision that conclusively delineates the issue herein addressed
manifests itself as the primary reason for the differences among the
various circuit court decisions. Although a circuit-by-circuit analy-
sis may be a cumbersome way in which to address the law as it
currently stands within the United States, it does provide a unique
opportunity to illustrate the trends, patterns, and reasoning behind
the decisions.
1. Circuits Substantially Influenced By Prior
Determinations
Fourth Circuit courts have addressed the issue of the weight of
a prior ex parte Patent Office determination twice. A Maryland dis-
trict court found that Patent Office determinations, while not bind-
ing, should at least be entitled to consideration. In support, the
district court stated that the issue of confusing similarity between
the same marks had twice been presented to the Patent Office, once
in an application for the same mark by a stranger, once by the
plaintiff in the infringement action, and in both cases the Patent
Office decided that the marks were not confusingly similar.53 Thus,
the court used the prior determinations of no confusing similarity to
support its own conclusion that the marks were not similar on their
face. Contrary to the pattern found in many cited cases, the plain-
tiff here had the prior Patent Office determination used against him,
instead of against the defendant.54
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated a number of
53. Wembly, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Co., 216 F. Supp. 565, 580-581 (D.C. Md. 1963).
54. 216 F. Supp 565, 582-583. Analysis of the issue of confusing similarity lead the
[Vol. 4
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years later that it would go one step further than the district court
and give other administrative determinations on the possibility of
confusion between marks serious consideration." In granting
plaintiff, "Comsat," injunctive relief restraining defendant, "Corn-
cet," from infringing upon plaintiff's registered servicemark, the
court considered an SEC requirement that "Comcet" state in its
prospectus that it was not related to "Comsat."5 6 The court
pointed out that the expertise of the SEC in matters of this kind
should not be lightly put aside. 7 Thus, although the court was not
following a Patent Office determination, it was still according sub-
stantial weight to the decision of an administrative agency in the
area of determining likelihood of confusion.
The Eleventh Circuit is yet to have a court of appeals ruling on
the issue of the subsequent effect of an ex parte Patent Office deter-
mination. 8 As a result, the district courts have mainly relied on
Carling Brewing Co., v. Phillip Morris, Inc., in which "Black Label"
for cigarettes was found to infringe the registered mark "Black La-
bel" for beer. 9 Defendant had received a final rejection in its at-
tempt to register the mark. The record also indicated that various
third parties had attempted registration of similar marks and had
likewise been rejected. Although the district court did not find the
prior determinations binding on the issue, the court found that the
Patent Office's "day-to-day expertise in adjudicating cases wherein
the ultimate question decided was the question of 'likelihood of con-
fusion' " was entitled to respectful consideration.60
Rather than simply state that the Patent Office's prior assess-
ment of the marks was correct and supported the court's own con-
clusion, the Carling court went on to cite a portion of a ruling of an
Assistant Commissioner which addressed the distinction between
the right to use and the right to register.61 The Assistant Commis-
sioner's ruling stated that a prior decision by a federal court on the
right to use a mark would be determinative to any subsequent find-
court to inquire into plaintiff's use, whereupon the court found that plaintiff's marks were
descriptive of functional features and were therefore invalid.
55. Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comeet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1970).
56. 429 F.2d 1245, 1249.
57. 429 F.2d 1245, 1251.
58. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (1lth Cir. 1981) (en banc) (all decisions
of the Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Elev-
enth Circuit).
59. Carling Brewing Co., Inc. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ga.
1968).
60. 297 F. Supp. 1330, 1337.
61. Ex Parte Crown, 102 U.S.P.Q. 312 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1954).
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ings on the right to register the same mark. The Assistant Commis-
sioner also stated that if there was no right to use, there could be no
right to register, although the converse may not always be true. In
other words, a denial of registration by the Patent Office may have
no bearing on a court's determination of right to use. Therefore, it
was completely within a courts's discretion to follow any prior Pat-
ent Office determination.6 2 Evidently the Carling court not only
found following the Patent Office determination within its discre-
tion, but the court also chose to ignore the Assistant Commis-
sioner's insistence that such prior proceedings were not to be given
significant weight.
The reasoning behind the district court's reliance on the Patent
Office determination may, however, find some support in that there
was no real need for the court not to find a likelihood of confusion,
due to similarities between the marks themselves. In the final rejec-
tion of the application for the mark "Black Label" for cigarettes,
the Trademark Examiner declared that many beer drinkers smoke
cigarettes as well as drink beer. "The two go hand in hand into the
same mouth and it is consequently not seen how consumer confu-
sion as to source could be avoided."63
The district court evidently had a difficult time refuting such
logic, as have two other Eleventh Circuit district courts, both of
which have considered extremely similar marks. In addition, both
have cited Carling as authority for the proposition that Patent Of-
fice determinations are to be accorded substantial weight. 64  A
fourth Eleventh Circuit district court case held that a Patent Office
Examiner's expert decision was entitled to great weight. However,
in that case the Patent Office conclusively determined that defend-
ant's mark "Taco Uno," which had initially been rejected on the
basis of plaintiff's mark "Pizzeria Uno," was not confusingly simi-
lar to plaintiff's mark. Hence, the court found no infringement.65
62. Id. at 314.
63. Caring Brewing Co., Inc. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D.
Ga. 1968).
64. Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of South Flor-
ida, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. 282 (S.D. Fl. 1978) ("Better Business Bureau of South Florida" was
found to be confusingly similar to "Council of Better Business Bureaus"); Miss Universe, Inc.
v. Little Miss USA, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 277 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("Little Miss USA" for young
girls beauty pageant found to be confusingly similar to "Miss USA Beauty Pageant" for
women).
65. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 218 U.S.P.Q. 425 (D.S.C. 1983) Although the court
accorded the PTO decision great weight, it went on to consider an amalgam of additional
factors. For a discussion of those factors, see Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research &
Development, Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981).
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The last of the circuits substantially influenced by prior ex
parte Patent Office determinations is the Second Circuit, which ac-
cords the prior rulings more weight than any of the other circuits.
In Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R.H. Macy Co., Inc.,66 plaintiff's mark
"Gropals" for shoes and hosiery was not entitled to registration
over defendant's mark "GRO (representation of a tree) SHOE."
The court, which was hearing the case on appeal from an ex parte
Patent Office rejection reversed by the district court, likewise re-
versed the district court's decision and granted an injunction.
The Miles Shoes case established two important points. First,
it questioned why the plaintiff chose the similar mark and specu-
lated that there may have been a deliberate purpose to obtain some
advantage from the trade which defendant had built. Second, the
court held that absent evidence of actual confusion, the decision
must rest on the court's conviction as to possible confusion. A fac-
tor for consideration would be the prior denial of registration, since
the Patent Office's familiarity in dealing with such problems may
properly be accorded substantial weight.67
Unlike the fact pattern in a majority of the cases, this case was
originally only an ex parte appeal, which in the normal course of
events would not have involved the owner of the registered mark.
For some reason, the plaintiff added a claim for declaratory relief of
noninfringement, whereupon the owner of the registered mark was
able to come in as a defendant and fie a claim for infringement.68
With the same court hearing both the ex parte registration appeal
and the infringement cause of action, the court had little desire to
rule twice on the issue of likelihood of confusion, or recognize any
difference between the two tests.
Subsequent cases within the Second Circuit, all of which refer
to preliminary Patent Office determinations and cite Miles Shoes as
support, have continued to add to the weight given to Patent Office
rejections and ignore the uniqueness of the Miles Shoes case. One
1969 case made particular reference to defendant's persistent use of
a mark despite the Patent Office's denial of registration of the mark
based upon a likelihood of confusion with plaintiff's mark.69 The
court then addressed the subsequent effect of defendant's continued
use of the mark "Kiki," for tights, swim wear and sports wear. In
66. Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., 199 F.2d 602 (2nd Cir. 1952).
67. 199 F.2d 602, 603.
68. 199 F.2d 602.
69. Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., 411 F.2d 1097 (2nd Cir.
1969).
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addition to finding the use to be an infringement, the court stated
that but for the district court's misconception regarding the burden
of proving defendant's bad faith, a finding of bad faith could not
very well have been avoided.7"
A year later, the same court found that additional acts by the
infringer may significantly add to the court's findings of bad faith.
The knowledge of the trademark owner's vigorous contesting of
continued use of the mark, attempts to buy out the trademark
owner's business, and lack of proof by the defendant of its good
faith belief that the plaintiff's mark was not in use prior to the
adoption of the defendant's mark may all be considered.7 Defend-
ant attempted to register "Cuti-Trim" for cuticle clippers, but had
been refused registration because of plaintiff's registered mark
"Trim," for nail and cuticle clippers. Additional acts by the de-
fendant, coupled with defendant's continued use of the mark "in the
teeth of [two] Patent Office refusal[s] to register," led the court to
agree with the district court's findings of bad faith and
infringement.72
In another case decided that same year, a district judge denied
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because he did not find
the marks to be confusingly similar to the average viewer.73 On mo-
tion for reargument, plaintiff produced a Patent Office ex parte re-
jection of defendant's mark based upon the likelihood of confusion
to plaintiff's registered marks. Although the district judge stated
that he was not bound by the Patent Office determination, he deter-
mined that the expertise of the trademark examiners entitled their
view to respectful consideration. The district judge accordingly
found the previously nonexistent confusion to exist, and without
further analysis of the marks in question, stated that plaintiff would
be entitled to summary judgment if plaintiff could show a likelihood
of damages.74
Subsequent decisions within the Second Circuit have been sub-
stantially influenced by Patent Office determinations. These courts
have stressed similar factors in finding infringement75 and bad faith
70. 411 F.2d 1097, 1101.
71. W.E. Basset Co. v. Revelon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2nd Cir. 1970).
72. W.E. Basset Co. v. Revelon, Inc., 470 (S.D. N.Y. 1969) and approved by the Second
Circuit upon review, W.E. Basset Co. v. Revelon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 660 (2nd Cir. 1970).
73. D.M. & Antique Import Corp. v. Royal Saye Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), supplemental opinion, as modified, (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
74. Id. at 1274.
75. Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566 (2nd Cir. 1971)




by a defendant76 in adopting confusingly similar marks.
2. Circuits Less Persuaded by Prior Patent Office
Determinations
In 1969, the First Circuit held that a district court was justified
in going beyond the side-by-side comparison of marks, as practiced
within the Patent Office.77 The district court stated that it was free
to consider other matters likely to influence the prospective pur-
chasers. Other matters which a court may consider include the type
of products on which the mark was used, the price of the products,
and the types of customers likely to buy each parties' products.78
Although the case did not directly involve a consideration of the
weight of prior Patent Office determinations, the decision has
formed the basis of a number of subsequent decisions.
In one of the more recent decisions, a Rhode Island district
court found that "EXEC'MINDER," for business related materials
was confusingly similar to the registered mark "EXECUTIVE'S
WEEKLY MINDER" for similar products.79 In granting plain-
tiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court noted that the
Patent Office had refused to register defendant's mark on the basis
of plaintiff's mark and had suspended further prosecution of the
mark pending a determination in the infringement action. While
the court reached the same conclusion as the Patent Office, the
court stated that the preliminary Patent Office determination was of
only limited usefulness. "At the level of the administrative process
at which the determination was made, the determination could well
have been based upon a doubt concerning the originality of the de-
fendant's mark, and not upon a definitive finding that there was
indeed confusion." 80
A trademark application for registration may be rejected for a
number of reasons: likelihood of confusion, descriptiveness, gener-
icness, or improper drawings. Although the district court above did
not say whether defendant's mark had been rejected for more than
one reason, the quote from the opinion indicates that there may
have been two or more bases for rejection. In addition, the district
court indicated that it was aware that there are various administra-
tive levels within the Patent Office. All of these factors may have
76. Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 596 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
77. R.G. Barry Corp. v. A. Sandier Co., Inc., 406 F.2d 114 (Ist Cir. 1969).
78. 406 F.2d 114, 115.
79. Clark, Inc. v. Resnick, 219 U.S.P.Q. 619 (D.R.I. 1982).
80. Id. at 624.
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led the district court to believe that the determination may not have
been a full consideration of the issue of likelihood of confusion by
the Patent Office, and of only questionable authority.
The Eighth Circuit did not consider a federal statutory in-
fringement action in the one case it has decided. The case focused
on the common law right to use a mark and have that mark pro-
tected if first appropriated and used in connection with a particular
business."1 Plaintiff had previously registered "SweeTarts" for
dried prunes, but had expanded its use of the mark to include candy
products without obtaining a registration for such a use. Plaintiff,
therefore, only had a common law right to use the mark for candy.
Defendant selected the mark "SweeTarts" for a new hard candy
product. Despite a trademark search that revealed plaintiff's iden-
tical mark, as well as other similar marks, defendant's president de-
cided to take a "businessman's risk" and use the name.8 2
Although the infringement action that followed was based on
state common law, the test for infringement was still the "likelihood
of confusion" between the marks. The court noted that the Patent
Office had rejected defendant's application for registration on the
basis of likelihood of confusion between defendant's mark and prior
registered marks (including plaintiff's). In citing the prior Patent
Office determination, the court stated that the prior decision could
have no direct influence upon their decision, for "[w]e are con-
cerned solely with the common law rights between the two par-
ties." 3  However, despite the court's asserted independent
evaluation of likelihood of confusion, defendant's mark was still
found to infringe plaintiff's mark.
There is no known case in the Seventh Circuit which directly
addresses the issue of the subsequent effect of a Patent Office "like-
lihood of confusion" determination. One case held that the "test
for infringement is likelihood of confusion of the consumer; it does
not depend upon the action or views of the Patent Office."8 4 How-
ever, the court was referring to plaintiff's ill-founded reliance upon
a Patent Office requirement that plaintiff disclaim a part of its mark,
as proof that the nondisclaimed portion was the salient part of the
mark. Instead of reciting the ex parte Patent Office proceeding as
proof of likelihood of confusion, plaintiff was referring to the deci-
81. SweeTarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1967).
82. 380 F.2d 923, 925.
83. 380 F.2d 923, 925, n.1.
84. Mr. Travel, Inc. v. V.I.P. Travel Service, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 958, 961 (N.D. II1.
1966), affirmed, 385 F.2d. 420 (7th Cir. 1967). The decision on appeal only affirmed the basic
holding and did not discuss the relevant portion of the prior decision.
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sion in an attempt to show that defendant was infringing the salient
part of its mark. Hence, plaintiff needed proof of what part of the
mark was salientY Although there is no way to determine whether
the court intended its broad language to be interpreted to apply to
prior decisions regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the
decision can stand for the rule that blind acceptance of prior deter-
minations should not be uniformly practiced.
In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff sought to register "Use AR-
RID To Be Sure." This application was rejected by the Patent Of-
fice because the mark was descriptive and confusingly similar to
defendant's mark "SURE." Plaintiff, the owner of the unregistered
mark, brought an action for unfair competition and common law
trademark infringement. Defendant counterclaimed for declaratory
relief and to enjoin plaintiff from infringing defendant's registered
mark. After a judgment for defendant, plaintiff asserted that de-
fendant's mark should have been cancelled because it was descrip-
tive. To support this proposition, plaintiff introduced the Patent
Office determination, which found its own mark to be descriptive.
Plaintiff stated that one portion of the determination should be used
by the court against defendant, while at the same time asserting that
the remainder of the rejection concerning likelihood of confusion
should be ignored. Plaintiff's reasons for ignoring the adverse por-
tion of the prior decision were that plaintiff abandoned the applica-
tion and defendant had not previously asserted the prior
determination as a defense.86
The court noted plaintiff's inconsistent position concerning the
weight of the Patent Office determination and stated that under the
circumstances, "[a]ny such determination made by the Patent Office
... must be regarded as inconclusive since made at its lowest ad-
ministrative level."'8 7 The court then went on to hold that the Pat-
ent Office determination was "rendered even less persuasive still by
the fact that the Office did not have before it the great mass of evi-
dence presented to both the District Court and the Appellate Court
in support of the claims."88 The court still affirmed the district
court's judgment for defendant in the counterclaimed infringement
action. Thus, the court indirectly supported the Patent Office deter-
mination. Furthermore, no subsequent court has cited this portion
of the court's holding for support of a similar position. However,
85. Id.
86. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1970).
87. 434 F.2d 794, 802.
88. 434 F.2d 794, 802.
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the case has been repeatedly followed on other issues and appears to
be highly regarded.
A recent district court decision from the Central District of
California found that a prior uncontested administrative action
could be accorded some consideration.89 As a district court deci-
sion in contravention of the circuit court's precedential holding, it is
questionable that such a decision will carry much weight in subse-
quent litigation.
An even more recent decision of the Sixth Circuit appeared to
directly address the issue of the weight of a patent office determina-
tion in a subsequent infringement action.90 Among the issues on
appeal was appellant's claim that the district court had failed "to
consider a prior opinion of the United States Trademark Office Ex-
aminer that a likelihood of confusion exists between appellant's and
Thomas' use of the marks CLASSIC and CLASSIC car wash on
their goods and services." Although the circuit court held that de-
terminations by the Patent Office on registerability are "prima facie
evidence" of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark on the
goods or services specified in the registration, the court was only
refering to determinations regarding Appellant's right to register its
marks. However, the court did state that the district court erred by
examining the two marks side-by-side in the infringement action, 9'
thereby indicating that if the district court was wrong in making a
determination of likelihood of confusion based on the right to regis-
ter test, then use of a Patent Office determination based on the same
test would likewise be improper.
3. Ex Parte Circuit Decisions in Summation
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have accorded Patent
Office determinations substantial weight in subsequent infringement
actions. The Second Circuit not only accords such determinations
substantial weight, but in the Second Circuit, continuing to use a
mark after a rejection is likely to result in a finding of bad faith by
the infringer.
In contrast, the First Circuit, while not completely disregard-
ing Patent Office determinations, has recognized that many such
rulings should not be relied on in subsequent actions because of the
89. Cynthia Grey v. Campbell Soup Company, 231 U.S.P.Q. 562, 567 (C.D.Cal. 1986)
(defendant's marks "Dogiva" and "Cativa," for pet food packaged in foil wrapped boxes, was
found to infringe registrant's mark "Godiva" for chocolates wrapped in gold foil).
90. Wynn. Oil Co. v. Thomas, No. 86-5824 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1988).
91. Id. at 7-8.
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administrative nature of the Patent Office's decision. The Seventh
and Eighth Circuits have not directly ruled on the effect of Patent
Office determinations in subsequent federal infringement actions.
However, there appears to be a possibility that these circuits would
stress independent evaluation of the marks over blind acceptance of
any prior determination. The Ninth Circuit has determined that an
ex parte Patent Office determination may be inconclusive due to its
low level administrative nature. Any such finding by the Ninth Cir-
cuit would be bolstered by a change of circumstances during the
period between the registration application and the infringement
action.
B. Subsequent Effect of Inter Partes Patent Office
Determinations
1. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata Effect
The Supreme Court stated in Brenner9" that prior ex parte
Patent Office determinations were not binding in subsequent in-
fringement actions. The Supreme Court did not elaborate as to
what this binding effect was, and why it did not apply to prior ex
parte decisions. In stating that the prior decisions were not binding,
the Court meant that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel
were available to prevent adjudication of the issues in the subse-
quent action.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the mer-
its in one suit bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties or
their privies arising out of the same set of operative facts based on
the same cause or causes of action.93 There are four basic elements
of collateral estoppel:
(1) That the previously decided issue be identical to the one cur-
rently before the court;
(2) That there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior
action;
(3) That the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted
was a party (or privy) in the prior action;
(4) That the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior
action.94
92. Brenner v. Manson, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 148 U.S.P.Q. 689 (1966).
93. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 75 S.Ct. 865, 867, 99 L.Ed 1122, 1126
(1955).
94. Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., 170 U.S.P.Q. 538 (TTAB 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 179 U.S.P.Q. 491 (CCPA 1973) (for application in trademark cases);
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In ex parte rejection actions, cited in subsequent infringement
actions, res judicata would not be applicable because the registra-
tion application and the infringement action are not the same cause
of action. Similarly, under collateral estoppel, one could argue that
the previously decided issue was not identical (right to register ver-
sus right to use), that the Examiner's decision was not a final judg-
ment (because it was an administrative determination), and that a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the right to use was not
presented in the Patent Office action.
While the two doctrines cannot generally be used when the
prior determination was ex parte,95 they take on new life when the
prior decision was an interpartes proceeding between the same par-
ties. 96 Many applicants can have an application for registration of a
mark approved by the Examiner before running into problems, such
as having the registration opposed or being subject to a cancellation
proceeding prior to being sued for infringement. Therefore, it is
necessary to determine how prior inter partes determinations are
treated in subsequent infringement actions between the same
parties.
2. Inter Partes Circuit Decisions in Summation
Although ex parte related cases divide evenly into two basic
groups, interpartes related cases are much more convoluted and do
not easily divide. In part, the lack of divisibility is due to factual
discrepancies from case to case caused by changing patterns within
several of the circuits. Some of the courts had started out following
one line of decisions within a circuit and then later switched to a
conflicting view without referring to the status of the prior deci-
sions. Another factor that distinguishes the inter partes cases from
the ex parte cases is the level of review that the former cases have
reached in comparison to the level reached by the latter cases.
The highest level of review in any of the reported exparte cases
was a Commissioner's (Appeals Board) ruling.97 The remainder of
see also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 91 SCt. 1434
(1971) (accepted by Supreme Court for application in patent cases).
95. The Appeals Board has held that the preclusive effect of prior proceedings are not
necessarily negated by their ex parte nature or by the fact that the opposer in a subsequent
interpartes action was not a party to the prior action, at least so far as the issue of functional-
ity is concerned. Lukens Inc. v. Vesper Corporation, I U.S.P.Q. 2d 1299, 1301 (TTAB 1986).
96. Los Angeles Bonaventure Company v. Bonaventure Associates, 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1882
(TTAB 1987) (prior opposition proceeding involving a different party cannot have a res judi-
cata effect in a subsequent action, and although collateral estoppel may apply, it may not be
appropriate when under consideration for summary judgment).
97. Supra note 66.
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the determinations terminated within varying levels of the examina-
tion process. In comparison, most inter partes proceedings do not
start until the mark in question has passed the examination stage,
and may be initially litigated before the Appeals Board. Accord-
ingly, the higher a Patent Office determination was allowed to pro-
ceed, the greater the probability that the court in subsequent
infringement actions would be swayed. A concurrent result can be
projected for ex parte related cases.
A number of courts attempt to draw a distinction between Pat-
ent Office determinations based on the right to register a mark and
infringement proceedings based on the right to use the mark. Those
courts that find any distinction between the two tests at all go on to
consider other factors. Those courts that do not find a distinction
will usually collaterally estop a party from denying a likelihood of
confusion determination made in a prior interpartes proceeding be-
tween the same two parties and the same two marks.
The additional factors considered by some of the courts, or the
reason why collateral estoppel was not warranted, concern the al-
leged infringer's ability to present additional use-related evidence
that would not have been available in the prior proceeding. The
amount of additional evidence required varies from court to court.
A number of courts find that a Patent Office determination is con-
trolling unless the contrary can be established by thoroughly con-
vincing evidence. Other courts find any additional evidence over
what was before the Patent Office to be sufficient to halt application
of collateral estoppel. In line with this reasoning, a change in facts,
such as market conditions, uses, customers, business volume, and
advertising, during the interim period between the inter partes pro-
ceeding and the infringement action, would often be sufficient to
deny use of collateral estoppel.
The three general paths guiding the circuits are as follows: (1)
those circuits that recognize the right to use-right to register distinc-
tion and consider additional factors before evaluating what, if any
weight, the prior determination should have (the additional factors
rule); (2) those circuits that hold the prior determination control-
ling unless contrary evidence is sufficient to carry a thorough con-
viction (the controlling absent thoroughly convincing contrary
evidence rule); and (3) those circuits which hold that Federal Cir-
cuit decisions, as well as other lower level decisions, are to be ac-
corded complete binding effect on all issues and questions of fact
actually litigated and determined in the prior determination (the
binding rule). However, as was stated earlier, if a circuit has con-
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fronted the issue more than once, there is a good chance that the
circuit has mixed together two or three of the paths.
a. Circuits Following the Additional Factors Rule
In a 1946 infringement action, the First Circuit stated that an
Assistant Commissioner's (Appeals Board) decision in an opposi-
tion proceeding could be entitled to weight, yet under the circum-
stances of the case in question, the prior decision was not
controlling.98 The Appeals Board determination involved an oppo-
sition proceeding in which the plaintiff acquired registration of a red
ball mark for application to soles and heels of shoes. The defendant
was attempting to register a red oval mark for similar applications.
The court, in affirming an interlocutory decree denying plaintiff re-
lief for trademark infringement, recognized that other factors, apart
from side-by-side comparison of the marks and goods, should be
considered before a finding of infringement could be rendered.
These additional factors included: (1) the absence of evidence of
actual confusion in the minds of purchasers due to such use; (2) the
infliction of little injury upon the plaintiff; (3) defendant's mainte-
nance of relatively good quality in the goods; and (4) defendant's
principal business confinement to a market in which the plaintiff
was inactive. 99
A second case within the same circuit held that a prior Court
of Customs and Patent Appeal's (Federal Circuit) determination in
an opposition proceeding, which determined confusing similarity
with regard to the marks alone, could not be used to estop the plain-
tiff from presenting evidence in conformance with Minnesota
law."o Minnesota common law regarding trademark infringement,
at that time, considered whether ordinary purchasers under ordi-
nary circumstances exercising ordinary care, would be deceived as
to the source of a product.'01 The court denied defendant's motion
for summary judgment in the infringement action. Although the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had decided that the marks
were not confusingly similar under 35 U.S.C. 1052(a),' 0 2 a test
which is similar to the likelihood of confusion test under 35 U.S.C.
1052(d), neither of the two tests were considered sufficiently similar
98. Mishawaka Rubber Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 153 F,2d 662 (1st Cir. 1946).
99. 153 F.2d 662, 664.
100. Mayo Foundation v. Poxsee Food Corp., 183 U.S.P.Q. 355 (D. Minn. 1974)
("Mayo" for a medical institution versus "Mayo 7" for imitation mayonnaise).
101. Id. at 358.
102. 35 U.S.C. 1052(a) (1986). This section requires that registration be denied if a mark
sought to be registered confusingly suggests connection with an institution.
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to Minnesota law. The distinction between Minnesota law and the
federal statutes rendered the prior decisions on the issues incapable
of having collateral estoppel effect. 103
Previously discussed ex parte Second Circuit decisions ap-
peared to almost apply collateral estoppel to the issue of likelihood
of confusion. However, an indication that the circuit may be mov-
ing away from its earlier extreme stance can be found in a number
of decisions.
A district court from the Southern District of New York re-
fused to grant a stay of an infringement action pending a determina-
tion in an opposition proceeding before the Trademark Trial and
Appeals Board. Although the inter partes action was between the
same two parties and concerned the issue of likelihood of confusion,
the court did not feel that the parties in the infringement action
should be affected by a right to register decision of the Appeals
Board."° The court also stated that it could understand deferring
the trial until the Patent Office acted, if the "case presented intricate
technical questions or highly specialized subject matter," such as
might be found in a patent case.10 5 However, the court noted that
in both the present case, and the Appeals Board opposition proceed-
ing, the common question concerned the likelihood of confusion,
the determination of which did not "appear to require any major
application of highly specialized principles or expertise."10 6
In 1984, another district court from the southern district of
New York held that while the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals (Federal Circuit) is an Article III court,'07 and its findings
may have estoppel effect, use of the doctrine in the case being con-
sidered would not promote judicial economy because the plaintiff
sought to assert the doctrine offensively." 8 Plaintiff sought a mo-
tion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel. For support of its motion, plaintiff cited the Court of
Custom and Patent Appeal's prior determination in the opposition
proceeding that "Plus" for health products was confusingly similar
103. Mayo Foundation v. Poxsee Food Corp., 183 U.S.P.Q. 355 (D. Minn. 1974).
104. Tuvache, Inc. v. Emilio Pucci Perfumes Int'l, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
105. Id. at 105.
106. Id. at 106.
107. Supra note 48.
108. Plus Products v. Natural Organics, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), citing
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-330 (1979) to support its position that
holding otherwise would encourage the plaintiff to bring additional actions because he could
prevail on the grounds of the previous decisions.
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to "Nature's Plus" for similar products. 109
The court stated that the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals' determination was only based on a side-by-side comparison of
the marks and the products on which they appeared during the
1970's. Since that time, the market, consumers, volume of business
and advertising of the parties changed substantially. Thus, in deny-
ing plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, based on the estoppel
effect of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' ruling, the court
stated the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' determination on
likelihood of confusion may be totally irrelevant.11 Neither case
was directly on point regarding the subsequent weight of prior de-
terminations in the infringement action. However, the cases do pro-
vide an interesting contrast to the Second Circuit's treatment of
prior exparte determinations."'1 Logically, a prior inter partes pro-
ceeding involving the same parties should have a collateral estoppel
effect in a subsequent action before an ex parte determination
would. The cases have not developed in that manner.
In finding "Perma-Stone" and "Perma-Rock" for similar con-
struction materials not to be confusingly similar and no infringe-
ment, a Maryland district court emphasized that there was more to
an infringement analysis than the side-by-side analysis practiced
within the Patent Office. 12 The court found the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals' opposition determination was entitled to re-
spectful consideration. "However, a comparison of the record in
the Patent Office proceeding with the record in this case at bar
shows that the relevant facts have been more fully developed in this
court.""1 3 Thus, at least one district court in the Fourth Circuit
recognizes the registration-use distinction, and the questionable au-
thority of low level Patent Office determinations. In addition, the
court will also disregard the doctrine of collateral estoppel when
presented with additional evidence.
b. Circuits Following the Controlling Absent
Thoroughly Convincing Contrary Evidence
Rule
A question concerning the binding effect of an interpartes dis-
trict court determination was presented in American Heritage Life
109. Plus Products v. Natural Organics, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
110. Id. at 28-29.
111. Supra notes 66-76.
112. Perma-Stone Co. v. Perma-Rock Products, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 616 (D.Md. 1958).
113. 160 F. Supp. 616, 619.
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Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co.1 14 Heritage had attempted to reg-
ister "Heritage" but was successfully opposed in an Appeal Board
action by American. American then filed for the same mark and
was granted registration. Heritage subsequently appealed the Ap-
peals Board ruling to the District Court for the Middle District of
Florida for a trial de novo. This suit was dismissed with prejudice
because Heritage failed to state with particularity any new evidence,
which if proved, would justify the court in setting aside the prior
ruling.I" American then brought an infringement action in a Texas
District Court in which Heritage counterclaimed for cancellation.
The Texas District Court dismissed the infringement action
and cancelled American's mark because of lack of distinctiveness.
The court held that a trial de novo on appeal to a district court from
the Appeals Board is indicative of Congress' intent not to invoke res
judicata or collateral estoppel in such cases. While the court ac-
knowledged that, in substance, the same parties were fighting over
the same name in both actions, the questions of law and fact and the
relief sought in the registration action were fundamentally different
from that presented in the infringement action." 6 Thus, the court's
determination was contrary to the result in the Patent Office
determination.
However, the court expressly stated that the lack of binding
effect did not prevent the Patent Office determination from being
entitled to great weight. In the context of a direct appeal from a
Patent Office determination, or in an infringement and cancellation
action, prior findings as to likelihood of confusion, descriptiveness,
and priority "must be accepted as controlling, unless the contrary is
established by evidence which in character and amount carries thor-
ough conviction, notwithstanding that the case is heard de novo in
the district court. 1 1 7 However the court did qualify this ruling to
extend only to findings made by the Patent Office in quasi-judicial,
adversarial proceedings between the same parties. The qualification
means that the court would not include ex parte proceedings under
this rule.
The Ninth Circuit apparently recognizes the distinction be-
tween the right to register test (See. 1052(d)) and the right to use
114. American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.
1974).
115. American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 145 U.S.P.Q. 413
(M.D.FI. 1965).
116. American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 9-10 (5th Cir.
1974).
117. 494 F.2d 3, 9-10.
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test (Sec. 1119(1)), as is illustrated by its lone ex parte decision.' 18
However, the circuit court has held that a district court's findings in
a de novo opposition proceeding are controlling in a subsequent in-
fringement action, unless the contrary can be established by testi-
mony which in character and amount carries thorough
conviction. 119 In reading the latter decision, the Ninth Circuit
court did not cite its prior ruling that held that Patent Office deter-
minations must be regarded as inconclusive, since made at the low-
est administrative level. 120
The court's failure to look to its single prior decision in the
area might be attributable to the fact that the opposition proceeding
passed from the Appeals Board to a district court for a trial de
novo. The Ninth Circuit appears to have come closest to making a
distinction between the various levels of review, but the court has
still not delineated what determinations, from an initial rejection to
an Appeals Board ruling, are considered to be low level administra-
tive determinations.
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, follows the American
Heritage decision of the Fifth Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit deter-
mined that prior Appeals Board opposition determinations were not
intended by Congress to have a binding effect on subsequent actions
due to the ability of the district courts to rehear Appeals Board
decisions de novo. "In this Circuit, a court hearing an infringement
claim is not legally and conclusively bound by a prior decision of
the [Appeals Board] regarding the same trademark in dispute. '"',
The court noted that some decisions by other circuits, such as those
followed in courts holding interpartes Patent Office determinations
to be binding in subsequent infringement actions, would not apply
in the Eleventh Circuit. 122
c. Circuits Following the Binding Rule
A Third Circuit case held that plaintiff's infringement action
did not need the support of a finding that defendant's failure to re-
spond to an opposition action was an admission of confusing simi-
larity. The court stated that the defendant's failure to respond, as
well as prior proceedings leading up to that action, were entitled to
118. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stage Coach Properties, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. 481,483 (9th Cir.
1982). But see Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1970).
119. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stage Coach Properties, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. 481, 483 (9th Cir.
1982).
120. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1970).
121. Freedom Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Way, 226 U.S.P.Q. 123, 125 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
122. Id. at 125 n.2.
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no weight.1 23 The same court, twenty-one years later, in denying a
motion for preliminary injunctive relief by plaintiff, found an Ap-
peals Board cancellation decision to have no controlling effect on a
subsequent court's hearing of an infringement action, especially
where there had been factual changes in the record before the Pat-
ent Office.
124
Another case within the same circuit, heard one year prior to
the first case, found a Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decision in a cancellation proceeding to be res judicata to that cause
of action in a subsequent infringement action. The binding effect
was limited only to matters which were actually litigated and previ-
ously decided. The cancellation proceeding was appealed for a trial
de novo to the District of Columbia, and subsequently an appeal
was filed with the Appellate Court. The court noted in the infringe-
ment action before a Delaware district court that the only issues
considered in the prior rulings had been the validity of plaintiff's
assignment of title and priority of use. Thus, the issue of likelihood
of confusion had not been addressed and could not therefore be re-
lied on in the infringement action. 125
The most recent decision in the Third Circuit follows the "Ad-
ditional Factors Rule." A different district court in the same circuit
follows the "Binding Rule." Because both of the courts are on
equal standing within the same circuit, neither controls, thus any
upcoming decisions within the circuit could go either way, or even
take a different route. 126
A 1970 Sixth Circuit district court opinion cites the Supreme
Court's holding in Brenner to support its determination that deci-
sions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Federal Circuit)
are final and binding in infringement actions. 127 As discussed ear-
lier, Brenner only excluded ex parte determinations from being ac-
corded binding effect. Thus, the district court interpreted the
Supreme Court's omission to mean that a Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals' ruling on likelihood of confusion in an inter partes
123. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. David Mfg. Co., 112 U.S.P.Q. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
124. Irving-Cloud Publishing Co. v. Chilton Co., 201 U.S.P.Q. 772, 775 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
125. Old Charter Distillery Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 108 U.S.P.Q. 165 (D.
Del. 1956).
126. A Third circuit district court hearing an appeal from the Trademark Trial and Ap-
peals Board held the findings of fact made by the Appeals Board were to be given great
weight and are not to be upset unless new evidence is introduced which in character and
amount carries thorough conviction. Har-bur Associates v. Docktor Pet Centers Inc., I
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1423, 1424 (E.D. Penn. 1986).
127. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp. 165 U.S.P.Q. 335 (E.D.
Mich. 1970).
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action was determinative to the issue in all regards. In making this
decision, the court apparently ignored any difference between deter-
minations based on right to use and those based on right to register.
The court's final determination limited the sweeping effect of
its previous language only to issues and questions of fact actually
litigated in the prior action. Thus, the court denied plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment pending a determination of other issues
previously litigated.'28
In 1949, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit origi-
nally determined that Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' inter
partes determinations were not decisive of the issue of infringement
in subsequent cases. 129 The court cited an earlier Seventh Circuit
ruling for this proposition,130 which had in turn been based on a
Supreme Court decision that was said to be statutorily outdated by
the Court's decision in Brenner.13 1
In an apparent attempt to avoid all of the confusion presented
by the Court of Appeals' decision, an Illinois district court, without
citing any of the three prior cases for support, determined that a
Patent Office interference decision was irrelevant in a subsequent
infringement action.1 32 The district court's determination was pri-
marily based on the difference between the right to register a mark
and the right to use a mark. 133 However, this case was not cited in
a later action that found an Appeals Board opposition proceeding to
be entitled to great weight, especially in the absence of substantial
evidence that contradicts the Appeals Board's findings. 134
Furthermore, in 1983, another Illinois district court stated that
the plaintiff, who had been unsuccessful in opposing defendant's
mark before the Federal Circuit, had made a good point concerning
the differences between right to use and right to register. However,
such a distinction was to be disregarded when considering the col-
lateral estoppel effect of Federal Circuit decisions. 135 To support
this ruling, once again the omissive language in Brenner was cited.
The 1983 Seventh Circuit district court opinion was almost en-
128. Id. at 336.
129. Syncromatic Corp. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 174 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1949).
130. John Morrel & Co. v. Doyle, 37 U.S.P.Q. 565 (7th Cir. 1938).
131. Brenner v. Manson, 86 S.Ct. 1033, 148 U.S.P.Q. 689 (1966); contra Postum Cereal
Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927).
132. Oakford Co. v. Kruger Co., 116 U.S.P.Q. 430 (S.D. Ill. 1957).
133. Id. at 434.
134. See Scientific Film Co., Inc. v. Scott Foresman & Co., 171 U.S.P.Q. 525 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
135. E.Z. Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. 161, 568 F.
Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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tirely based upon an Eighth Circuit opinion that determined that a
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' cancellation ruling was
binding on the issue of likelihood of confusion in a subsequent in-
fringement action.' 36 Once again, when a court decided that collat-
eral estoppel should apply, it expressly based the decision on the
grourids that no distinction existed between the right to use and the
right to register tests.137
3. Potential Effect of Proposed Lanham Act
Reforms
The United States Trademark Association released the results
of its two-year study of the Lanham Act on September 22, 1987.138
Subcommittees in both the House and Senate are reported to be
currently in the process of drafting legislation that will incorporate
the proposed legislative reforms. Although the study is not directly
relevant to the issues addressed by this comment, the study does
recommend adopting a dual system of registration which may affect
how courts view the dichotomy between determinations based on
the right to use and those based on the right to register.
The proposed dual system would permit applications on the
principal register to be based on either use in commerce or intent-
to-use in commerce. Applicants filing under the intent-to-use sys-
tem would have an extendable six month period from the notice of
allowance to commence use in commerce and to file a declaration of
such use.
139
Under the new system, registration could not be perfected
without use. No action based on the mark could be filed until regis-
tration was perfected. Likewise, no "intent-to-use" party, alleging
likelihood of confusion, could obtain a final judgment from the Pat-
ent Office sustaining an opposition or cancellation petition from a
court granting injunctive relief until registration was perfected with
registration on the principal register. It is possible for an applicant,
who is relying on a prior filing date and alleging likelihood of confu-
sion, to successfully oppose or cancel another mark without com-
mencing use provided the applicant obtained registration first."
Many persons,141 and the courts,142 already apparently confuse
136. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kroman Ind. Inc., 493 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 292.
138. BNA's PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Vol. 34, No. 848, 533-34 (Sept. 24,
1987).
139. Id. at 541.
140. Id. at 541.
141. Honorable Giles S. Rich, Role of the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals, in CON-
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the role of the Patent Office in ex parte and interpartes proceedings.
By allowing the Patent Office to grant registration subject to subse-
quent use, further confusion may result. There is a possibility that
some courts will interpret the registration to be a determination as
to the applicant's right to use the mark, rather than applicant's
right to register the mark. However, the potential benefit of an in-
tent-to-use registration system far outweighs the potential risk that
such a system will only add to the confusion of those trying to inter-
pret Patent Office decisions. Adequate attention must be directed to
the past problem of confusion and the potential problem of addi-
tional confusion regarding right to register and right to use. If these
problems are recognized, there is at least a potential for future deci-
sional uniformity with regard to the role of the Patent Office in the
registration process.
V. CLEARING THE AIR OF CONFUSION
Due to the Supreme Court's clear language in Brenner, there is
no dispute among the circuits as to whether an ex parte decision is
binding in the subsequent infringement action. However, the
Supreme Court's omission of language addressing the weight of all
Patent Office determinations, and the binding effect of inter partes
determinations in subsequent infringement actions, has done more
to confuse issues than the remainder of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion has done to clarify issues.
Given the wide variation in rulings among the circuits, there is
a low probability of the conflicting opinions being independently
justified. Thus, the only real means by which to settle the issue is to
convince the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a related case.
Yet, as was earlier noted, many practitioners have given up hope
that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to a trademark case.
Even if practitioners petitioned the court, and clients were willing to
pay the money, there is certainly no guarantee that the Court would
reverse its policy of refusing certiorari in trademark cases.
Absent a sure means of clearing up the conflict, a possible al-
ternative is to lobby Congress to change the infringement or regis-
tration tests to clearly define distinctions between the likelihood of
confusion analysis that is common to both statutes. The practicality
and likelihood of success of this alternative, or some other ap-
TEMPORARY TRADEMARK PROBLEMS IN CONTESTED PATENT OFFICE PROCEEDINGS (R.
Oziel ed. 1969).




proach, is probably no greater than the guarantee of being granted
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Seeing that there is no readily available means of controlling
the decisions of the circuit courts, the next best way to guide deci-
sions may be to provide the circuits with an authoritative body that
can be looked to for direction. In this regard, an analysis of how
the Patent Office treats its own prior determinations can be helpful.
Both the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Federal Cir-
cuit) and the Appeals Board have consistently held that ex parte
decisions, by each court respectively, cannot preclude de novo inter
partes consideration of the same issue at a later time.143 Thus,
neither court is willing to accord weight to prior determinations
made within the Patent Office when hearing a subsequent decision
considering similar matters. In support of this position, the Ap-
peals Board has stated that Section 17 of the Lanham Act specifi-
cally directs the Board to determine the respective rights of the
parties through independent determinations.14
Two additional factors that support the premise that initial
Patent Office exparte determinations, and even interpartes determi-
nations, should not be given weight in subsequent determinations,
can be found in 37 C.F.R. Sec. 2.67145 and 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1119.146
Section 2.67 allows a proceeding within the Patent Office to be sus-
pended for a certain period of time on a showing of good cause.
Other related proceedings pending before the Patent Office, or
courts of higher authority, are considered to be of sufficient cause.
Section 2.67 illustrates that the Patent Office is more than willing to
concede its duty to make certain decisions anytime a higher author-
ity will address a related issue that could affect its decision. Section
1119 states that a court hearing a case involving a registered mark
has the right to determine the right to registration, which can mean
ordering cancellation or restoration of a registered mark. Section
1119 further illustrates that Congress intended to place Patent Of-
fice administrative determinations at the bottom of the chain of au-
143. "This Board is not bound by the fact that the Office has - perhaps improvidently -
granted or denied registrations of similar subject matter for the same or similar goods and
services." Abraham's Seed v. John One Ten, 1 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1230, 1233 (TTAB 1986); In re
Stark, 172 U.S.P.Q. 402, 406 (CCPA 1972 (concerning ex parte patent proceedings); Krug
Vins Fins de Champagne v. Rutman Wine Co., 197 U.S.P.Q. 572 (TTAB 1977) (which held
that an Examiner's rejection of a mark and withdrawal of the rejection means nothing in a
subsequent inter partes determination).
144. Krug Vins Fins de Champagne v. Rutman Wine Co., 197 U.S.P.Q. 572 (TTAB
1977); Gruen Ind., Inc. v. Ray Curran & Co. 152 U.S.P.Q.. 778 (ITAB 1967).
145. 37 C.F.R. § 2.67 (1986).
146. Lanham Act § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 1119.
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thority in trademark cases. Thus, the Federal Circuit, the Patent
Office, and Congress apparently feel that Patent Office determina-
tions should not be of any particular significance in subsequent sim-
ilarly related actions and should be submissive, not determinative,
to the later proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the previous discussion, prior ex parte
Patent Office determinations are not binding in subsequent infringe-
ment actions, and are considered of questionable weight by half of
the circuits. Yet, in every single one of the infringement actions, the
courts consistently followed the Patent Office determination despite
language of independence by the courts. "The courts usually state
that the decision of the Patent Office in subsequent litigation be-
tween the parties is entitled to great weight, but it is not controlling.
Although this is their statement, the cases most often cited for this
proposition seem to go the other way." 14 7 This may be because the
courts are either subconsciously swayed by the prior rulings, or be-
cause every case that came before the court involved very similar
marks. Nevertheless, the results are such that if the prior determi-
nation is adverse to the applicant's interest, then the applicant is
best to avoid the subsequent litigation.
In contrast, inter partes related cases are evenly split as to
whether the subsequent infringement action follows the prior rul-
ing. A majority of the cases that did not follow the Patent Office
determination consisted of those cases in which a considerable
amount of time had passed between the prior ruling and the subse-
quent action. Therefore, the only reasonably sure means for an ap-
plicant to avoid losing in the infringement action is to make sure a
couple of years pass and some of the material facts change before
being sued. With the last two alternatives being out of the appli-
cant's control, the applicant may be destined to lose if sued for
infringement.
The simplest and most pervasive conclusion that can be drawn
from the rulings of the various courts is that the marks reported
herein were actually too similar (regardless of whether intentional
or coincidental) in either appearance or sound. Due to the actual
physical similarity between the marks, judges often had a difficult
time reaching an independent conclusion. Thus, the judges either
147. A. Robin, -When, How and Where in CONTEMPORARY TRADEMARK PROBLEMS
IN CONTESTED PATENT OFFICE PROCEEDINGS (R. Oziel ed. 1969).
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followed the Patent Office determination because the Patent Office
ruling was correct, or because the decision was much easier to make
when the judge considered that someone else, who regularly makes
this type of decision, had previously decided the same issue.
Taking into consideration all of the above, an attorney could be
doing an applicant an enormous favor by suggesting that filing for
registration be delayed until a thorough search can be completed, or
simply informing the applicant that it is within the applicant's best
interest to adopt a different mark. A trademark search is relatively
inexpensive, 148 and it is well settled that the advice of counsel, based
upon confidential communications of a client, is privileged from dis-
covery.1 49 In reality, however, many clients do not consider ob-
taining trademark protection until after they have established the
mark, which may make the mark too expensive to simply aban-
don.150 If the applicant has used the mark without conflict, the ap-
plicant may be able to continue to be ignored or unnoticed by the
owner of the mark. In such a situation, attempting registration of a
questionable mark may very well bring unwanted attention to the
applicant's use.
Finally, if registration of a questionable mark has been at-
tempted and rejected, it would be in the applicant's best interest to
terminate the application process while still within the administra-
tive level of the Patent Office. If a mark is questionable, but not
blatantly similar to a registered mark, some attorneys may find it
beneficial to at least apply for registration and see how the Exam-
iner initially responds. If the Examiner cites a mark anticipated to
be a problem by the attorney, the attorney and the client can then
reconsider proceeding with the application. Above all, if a Patent
Office determination is appealed as high as a court of appeals, espe-
cially the Federal Circuit, the client should be fully prepared to
abandon the mark if, and when, the appeal is lost.
Although some attorneys feel they have an obligation to vigor-
148. The average cost of a computerized trademark search varies from thirty-five to fifty
dollars.
149. 8 in 1 Pet Products, Inc. v. Swift & Co., 218 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also
Source Services Corp. v. Chicagoland JobSource Inc., I U.S.P.Q. 2d 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(evidence of effort to discover similar marks prior to adoption may be sufficient to block
summary judgment motion regarding wrongful intent).
150. See, e.g. Car-Freshner Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 268 F. Supp 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Defendant was the registrant of twenty-nine trademarks, and must have been "well versed in
the folklore of trademark practice and could easily have made a cursory Patent Office
search." Id. at 167. Nonetheless, at the time of the filing of the infringement action, defend-
ant had 150,000 catalogue sheets and an undisclosed supply of cans bearing the questionable
mark. Id. at 165.
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ously prosecute registration of the mark, they have a bigger obliga-
tion to fully advise the applicant of the potential dangers of
proceeding. The attorney may occasionally have to talk the overly
enthusiastic applicant out of digging his own judicial grave. In
short, telling an applicant to "go fish" for a different mark, despite
what the applicant already has in his hand, may be the best and
least expensive advice an attorney can give.
